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The Stability of Mixed Income Neighborhoods in America
*
 
Whether people of differing types can live happily together is one of the most important social 
and political questions concerning urban areas. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, 
such mixing seems extremely unlikely. While the theoretical result seems well supported in 
the context of race, the evidence for income mixing is much less stark. Compared to the strict 
segregation predicted by the models (and embodied in the context of race), Americans live in 
economically diverse neighborhoods. While this has lead to some further theoretical 
experiments, the stability of this mixing has never been addressed as an empirical matter. It 
would be naïve to look at cross-sectional snapshots of income mixing as representing stable 
situations, since neighborhood change is a prevalent feature of American urban economies. 
This paper sketches out the empirical implications of slow transition towards the predicted 
equilibrium, and tests those implications. It is the first paper to directly evaluate the 
persistence and stability of mixed-income communities. The results are supportive of the 
three models of income segregation: income mixing appears to be unstable, although the 
adjustment process is slow. This work is of especial importance due to the focus mixed-
income communities receive in the urban planning and policy. 
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1  
Are people willing to live with others of different socio-economic status, or are situations 
in which highly integrated neighborhoods exists inherently unstable, with rich or poor 
residents fleeing the neighborhood?  This is an important question because mixed income 
neighborhoods have been hypothesized to have a wide variety of beneficial properties, 
such as helping their low-income residents improve their economic and social standing.   
The early theoretical work on the subject was unequivocal: mixed-income 
neighborhoods did not represent stable equilibria.  This theoretical result was extremely 
robust.  The work of Tiebout (1956), Alonso (1964) and Schelling (1969, 1971) all point 
towards this result, from extremely different sets of assumptions about people’s behavior.      
These results, however, seemed in stark contrast to the empirical reality.   
American cities, while highly racially segregated, are well mixed economically (Duncan 
and Duncan 1955).  In most cities, well over half the variance in income came from 
variations within the neighborhood, as opposed to variation across neighborhoods (Farley 
1977).
2  This apparent failure of the three fundamental models to predict a major aspect 
of American urban life brought forth a series of papers trying to extend the models to 
allow for stable income mixing.
3  
All these articles, however, have missed a central observation: every estimate of 
the extent of income mixing has been based on cross-sectional data.  That is, estimates of 
income segregation have almost without exception relied on data from one census.   
                                                 
1 The language of the paper is that of static models, so “stability” is used to mean a state in which there is 
no tendency for change.  In a dynamic model, transitional dynamics can be stable, even as they move to a 
long-run steady state.  A dynamic interpretation of this paper’s question is: can mixed-income 
neighborhoods exist in the long run, or are they only the products of transitional dynamics moving from 
one segregated steady state to another? 
2 Massey and Eggers (1990) and Miller and Quigley (1990) are two more recent papers in the same vein. 
3 Miyao (1978), de Bartolome (1990), Frankel (1998) and de Bartolome and Ross (2003) are some 
examples reviewed below. 
  1Studies using several years make comparisons at the national (or metropolitan) level, but 
never look at individual neighborhoods.   
This oversight is important for two reasons.  First, mixed income neighborhoods 
are a goal of federal and local urban policy.  Understanding the stability of such 
neighborhoods can thus inform implementation and prioritization of these policies.   
Secondly, looking only at cross-sectional data leaves the processes at work behind the 
snapshot unobserved.  The theoretical models describe equilibria: situations in which 
there is no process at work which will change the basic situation.  In this case, the models 
predict what cities will look like once they have stopped changing.  Thus, cross-sectional 
data cannot assess the accuracy of these predictions unless we could believe that 
American cities had reached some long-run equilibrium.   
In the presence of widespread urban transformations, with metropolitan areas like 
Atlanta doubling in population over the past decades while Detroit’s central city 
population declined by half, it seems unlikely that the American Metropolitan System has 
reached its long-run equilibrium.
4  Given endemic urban change, we are left with no real 
understanding of whether mixed-income neighborhoods can remain integrated, or if 
income mixing is largely a product of shifting urban demographics.     
This paper uses panel data of American census block groups to address this 
fundamental question.  Comparing the economic status of neighborhoods across time, it 
is the first paper ever to directly test the predictions the three seminal papers make about 
income sorting.  With data on a income spread within each neighborhood and a number 
of other neighborhood level variables collected over time, I am able to assess whether 
                                                 
4 Rosenthal (2008) documents the long-run changes that most urban neighborhoods exhibit.   
  2more economically mixed neighborhoods can maintain their high level of mixing, or 
whether this mixing will be fleeting.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section I describes the assumptions 
and results on income sorting of the three fundamental papers by Tiebout, Alonso and 
Schelling.  It then outlines the contributions of later authors trying to make sense of the 
seeming inconsistency between theory and reality.  Section II informally sketches the 
implications of the models in a dynamic setting with gradual adjustment toward 
equilibrium.  Section III puts forward a slightly more formal model, which derives some 
empirical regularities that should pertain if income mixing is not stable.   Section IV lays 
out the empirical strategy.  Section V describes the data, which are derived from U.S. 
Census data normalized to 2000 boundaries.  This allows us to take the census block 
group (“neighborhood”) as a unit of analysis instead of the metropolitan area as a whole.  
Section VI presents the results, which are supportive of the contention that income 
mixing is to a large extent an artifact of disequilibrium behavior.  A seventh section 
checks the robustness of these results to changes in specification, and examines some side 
results of the formal model in Section III.  Finally, section VIII concludes and remarks on 
the significance of this research for federal, state and local urban policy. 
I. Literature Review. 
The three fundamental contributions to this literature are briefly sketched below.  Some 
extensions to these models are then considered briefly.  Finally, the empirical 
implications of this literature are discussed. 
Reinterpreting suburbs as clubs in which like-minded people lived together using 
local politics to ensure preferred levels of public spending (on things like education, 
  3public safety, etc.), Tiebout showed in 1956 that people would choose residences 
according to their desires for such spending.  This process of “voting with your feet” 
would lead to a multitude of homogenous suburbs, with people of similar income living 
together, and working hard to keep people of lower economic status from moving in.  
The model seemed to capture something essential about the suburbanization process that 
was picking up steam during that decade.   
Alonso (1964) developed the “canonical” model of urban economics.  He posited 
a city with one employment center (downtown).  People traded off between short 
commutes near the center and cheaper land further out.  In the absence of any 
jurisdictional differences in public spending, this model produced a city which, in 
equilibrium, was characterized by circular zones around the downtown area, each 
containing only one income class.  As usually interpreted, the model implied 
concentrated poverty in the inner zones surrounded by successively wealthier zones of 
residence.
5  Just as in the model presented by Tiebout, this model predicted near-perfect 
segregation by income. 
Finally, Thomas Schelling (1969) came to the same conclusion from a completely 
different direction.  Assuming people cared about who their neighbors were, he generated 
a model in which people moved in or out of neighborhoods until the city was again 
perfectly segregated.  This occurred even under fairly unobjectionable assumptions about 
people’s preferences (e.g. they don’t want to be in the minority in their neighborhood).   
Although the model is usually interpreted in terms of racial segregation, the results are 
easily extended to income.  
                                                 
5 Brueckner and Rosenthal (2005) offer a compelling alternative to the standard interpretation of this result. 
  4It is important to stress the fundamental nature of the above contributions.   
Tiebout’s casting of local jurisdictions as public-spending clubs has been the central lens 
through which local public finance issues are viewed by economists.  The underpinnings 
of the Alonso’s monocentric city model have been the linchpin of urban economics.   
Schelling’s application of simple preferences in complex residence decisions has helped 
us understand the intractability of racial segregation.  While all these models have been 
elaborated in the ensuing decades, their fundamental significance and insightfulness have 
never been seriously doubted, nor should they be.    
As mentioned in the introduction, the stark predictions of total income sorting do 
not seem to be borne out by real city neighborhoods.  Realizing the dissonance between 
reality and the theoretical predictions, economic theorists have offered refinements to the 
basic models that they feel can help explain the apparently high levels of income mixing 
in American cities.  Most of these refinements come down to assuming some sort of 
advantage to living near people of divergent incomes.  These advantages are derived in 
many ways, and sometimes these additional assumptions are able to induce mixed-
income neighborhoods (sometimes, however, they are not).   
  Miyao (1978) examines the possibility of a mixed-income city in the presence of 
negative inter-group externalities (preference for segregation).  His “city” is completely 
open and non-spatial, and thus is more similar to a neighborhood than a metropolitan 
area, where access to the CBD varies over space.  In the non-spatial case, mixing is not 
stable.  Miyao is able to generate a stable mixing equilibrium by introducing distance to 
the CBD into the model, but only at the city level: the city has both rich and poor 
  5residents, but within the city residents are arranged in concentric rings alla Alonso and 
Muth.  This mixing equilibrium thus does not predict mixing at the neighborhood level.   
de Bartolome (1990) allows for asymmetric inter-group externalities in a 
jurisdictional set-up where poor people like to live with rich people, but rich people want 
to avoid the poor.  In this model, there are multiple equilibria, of which income mixing is 
one.  The model is mute on the spatial distribution of income classes within a jurisdiction.  
Frankel (1998) derives an asymmetric positive inter-group externality by assuming that 
the presence of poor people lowers the price rich people have to pay for private goods 
and services.  In this environment, income mixing is one of multiple equilibria, even in 
the presence of rich people’s preference not to associate with poor people.  The model 
assumes, however, that rich people and poor people buy the same sorts of goods and 
services, which is an undesirable assumption due to the non-zero income elasticities of 
many goods and services.  Thus, Frankel (1998) may be a better model of transitory-
income mixing within groups with similar permanent income. 
Finally, de Bartolome and Ross (2003) use a model with jurisdictional public 
service provision and Alonso-style access considerations to model residential choice 
within an urban area.  For certain parameters of their model, they show that both 
jurisdictional and spatial mixing are possible.  However the range of the parameter values 
where this is possible is small compared to the total parameter space, and in some 
parameter value combinations, mixing only occurs across jurisdictions, not within 
jurisdictions. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine other models using distinctions between 
permanent and current income, taste heterogeneity or some other means to induce 
  6equilibrium income mixing.  However, the general take away of this literature is that with 
enough massaging a model can be generated that will allow for mixing, sometimes, but 
that the qualitative theoretical results of Schelling, Alonso and Tiebout are remarkably 
robust.  In the face of the evidence that income mixing is fairly common (at least 
compared to racial segregation), the theoretical literature has not been able to reconcile 
these fundamental theories with the evidence.  On the one hand, this can be taken as a 
deficiency in the theoretical literature.  On the other hand, it might suggest that the 
evidence on income mixing needs a second look. 
Such a second look is extremely important due to the fundamental deficiency in 
the evidence against sorting up to this point: every one of the current estimates of the 
extent of income mixing relies on either cross-sectional data or takes very large 
aggregates (such as the metropolitan area) as their unit of analysis as in Jargowski (1996, 
2003).  Neighborhood level trends in income mixing have gone largely unexplored.  Very 
few authors have looked at what happens to the individual neighborhood over time.
6  If 
the equilibria suggested in the three fundamental models are not reached instantaneously, 
these studies simply cannot speak to the accuracy of the models’ predictions. 
 
II. Informal Theory. 
This section takes each of the three fundamental papers and sketches out dynamic 
versions of them.  By allowing for non-instantaneous transitions, it shows that in all three 
of the modeling “worlds” assumed by these authors, the sorting equilibrium will likely be 
                                                 
6 Two exceptions are Aaronson (2001) and Helms (2003), whose results are tangentially supportive of the 
work presented here.  Because neither of these authors is examining income mixing per se, their results are 
only suggestive in terms of the question of neighborhood stability.  Some dynamic evidence in support of 
long-run integration in the racial context is available in Clapp and Ross (2004). 
  7reached  via periods of unstable transitions characterized by some degree of income 
mixing.  The contention of this paper is that cross-sectional evaluations of income-mixing 
have been contaminated by assuming that the mixing evident in the data represents an 
equilibrium situation, but do not account for the fact that income mixing may be largely 
due to disequilibrium transitions. 
A) Alonso and the classical mono-centric city. 
In 1964, William Alonso proposed a theory of a monocentric city in which people 
faced a trade-off between access to the employment center and cheaper rents.  Muth 
(1969) expanded on this model.  Close-in residences cost more, but offered savings in 
terms of travel time to and from work each day.  Because the opportunity cost of time 
varies with income, and because the demand for land is also assumed to have a non-zero 
income elasticity, this basic set-up has stark predictions about income mixing: it will not 
occur.  There are two possible cases.   
The first case is that income increases demand for land faster than it increases 
commuting costs.  If this is the case, a monocentric city will be characterized by 
concentric rings of homogenous residents, with people becoming richer as one goes 
further from the center.  The second case is nicer for central city mayors, but no better for 
fans of mixed-income neighborhoods.  If commuting costs increase faster with income 
than demand for land, the equilibrium is exactly reversed.  People still sort themselves 
into concentric rings of identical incomes, but now the rich people live “downtown.”  The 
model has been extended to allow for the existence of polycentric cities, non-monotonic 
income gradients and additional dimensions over which people vary; the central intuition 
  8that similar people want to live in similar places (that is, sort) holds up in all these 
reformulations.   
While the Alonso model is static, the dynamics of the model can be understood 
through examination of its comparative statics.  To sketch out how substantial amounts of 
income mixing are consistent with a slightly extended Alonso-type model, we present in 
figure 2.1 a situation in which there are three groups: poor Baptists, rich Catholics and 
Heathens.  Heathens are like Catholics, except with fewer kids (which lowers their 
income elasticity of demand for land) and with two-wage-earner family structure (which 
increases their income elasticity of commuting costs).  
Figure 2.1: Transitions in a mono-centric city 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
R R R
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BB  BB 
BB 
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To motivate the changes in our city system, however, we assume that these 
Heathens arise suddenly out of the previous population of Catholics: the new generation 
of rich people are made up of low-fertility Heathens and traditional families with high 
fertility and stay-at-home moms.  At t = 0, Heathen incomes are such that they have the 
same bid-rent curve as rich Catholics, but both groups experience a steady increase in 
  9income over time.  At time zero, Heathens and Catholics coexist peacefully in the 
outskirts of the city.  As non-poor incomes increase, the Heathen bid-rent function 
becomes steeper than Catholics’ bid-rent function, and they cluster at the inside boundary 
of the non-poor areas as represented by the graph for t = 1.
7  Finally, at t = 2, the incomes 
of Heathens grow so high that they are actually able to out-bid Baptists for inner-city 
homes. 
While the transition from t = 0 to t = 1 represents a somewhat continuous shift of 
Heathens concentrating closer into their previous range, the transition from period one to 
period two represents a leap-frog action of a high income group moving to a new home-
land inside an existing group which then must move outward.  In this situation, Baptists 
are now surrounded by rich neighborhoods on each side.  This represents a major shift in 
urban structure, and it is the dynamics of this shift that are at issue. 
The three time periods depicted in figure 2.1 represent equilibria.  During the 
transition between periods one and two, the bid-rent function of the Heathens slowly 
becomes as steep as that of the Baptists, until –  at some critical point in “continuous” 
time between t =1 and t=2 – Heathen bids in the central city start to be higher than 
Baptists’ bids.  It is the behavior at and around this moment that we need to consider. 
A naïve interpretation of the model would imply that as soon as the bid-rent 
function of the Heathens is steeper than that of the Baptists, there is a cataclysmic shift in 
population, replete with caravans of heathens trucking in their Ikea furniture to their new 
condominiums as the poor Baptists trek down a trail of tears to their new slums in the 
                                                 
7 Actually, they will occupy some areas in which only rich people lived and some in which poor people 
lived.  As groups shift around the city, the bid-rent functions of the other groups will adjust upward or 
downward so that everyone has a place to live.  These considerations are eschewed here to make the 
presentation simpler. 
  10inner-ring suburbs.  State and local police guide and guard the counter-directional 
parades, and there is looting.   
Of course, this is not how it happens.  But it is important to stress that an analysis 
of cross-sectional data that assumes we are observing equilibrium outcomes is essentially 
making exactly this assumption: that neighborhood transitions happen quickly enough 
that we need not worry about them when we analyze census figures.   
In reality, as the bid-rent function of Heathens overtakes that of Baptists, the 
difference is at first quite small.  At first, even a poor renter paying on the actual bid-rent 
function would hardly notice the difference between his previous rent and the new market 
rent on the new Heathen bid-rent function.   
Moreover, owners of homes, whose “rent” is only an opportunity cost, would 
have a hard time sensing this minute increase in their opportunity costs without 
considerable market research.  Absentee landlords and management companies would 
similarly have a hard time, at first, realizing that they should be charging a new, Heathen-
compatible rent.  Since rich Heathens are probably moving into different types of 
residences than poor people, it is likely that landlords will feel that the cost of 
refurbishment is not warranted by the tiny increase in rent they could charge to the new 
Heathen market, at least at first. 
As Heathen incomes grow, however, their bid-rent function steepens, and the 
differences between the old, Baptist bid-rent function and the new, Heathen one will be 
easier to identify and harder to ignore.  Landlords will start kicking out old tenants as 
their leases end and beginning the process of refurbishment.  Apartments will convert to 
condominiums.  Eventually the increase in property value will be too much even for 
  11crotchety owners to ignore.  Their opportunity cost of residence will mount and they will 
eventually sell their residence.  Eventually, all the old residents that are left are people 
with very high subjective costs of relocation and a few lazy landlords.  These people 
eventually die off, and the inner city neighborhood will be fully gentrified.   
To at least some extent, this dynamic story relies on deviations from strict 
rationality, and thus may not be fundamentally satisfying for some of us.   This weakness 
is especially critical since no attempt is made here to fully draw out a structural theory of 
neighborhood transition, which might include upward sloping supply curves of 
contractors as an additional break on instantaneous gentrification.  However, the intuitive 
model advanced above seems much closer to the truth about gentrification than the naïve 
rationalist approach outlined previously. 
So, as time moves from period one to period two, we move from one equilibrium 
(the poor in the inner-city) to a new stable equilibrium (the poor sandwiched between 
Heathens and rich Catholics).  The intervening time period could be quite extended.  If it 
is much longer than 10 years, studies using census data at the metropolitan level will be 
guaranteed to be picking up large amounts of disequilibrium mixing in their estimates of 
neighborhood income segregation.     
B) Schelling and preferences for neighborhood racial composition.   
Thomas Schelling’s 1969 paper about neighborhood sorting came at the question 
of neighborhood integration from a completely different direction.  The main focus of his 
model was not income segregation, but racial segregation.  He showed that, even given 
relatively unobjectionable preferences for neighborhood racial composition, 
  12neighborhoods would become perfectly segregated.  The intuition of this model was later 
extended (Schelling 1971). 
The intuition is quite simple: suppose that every white person liked black people, 
but just didn’t want to stick out too much in their own neighborhood.  Assume blacks feel 
similarly about whites.  To operationalize this, we may say that no one wants to live in a 
neighborhood where over, say, 50% of their neighbors were the other race. 
It is clear that in such a situation, given an all white neighborhood, no black 
would be willing to move in and – given an all black neighborhood – no white person 
would be willing to move in.  An evenly mixed neighborhood (which in principle is 
acceptable to each race) has an inherent instability: if there is a sudden change in the 
population of blacks (e.g. because of relocation from the south), this could push the 
population of a neighborhood past the racial tipping point.  If enough blacks move in that 
they make up a larger percentage of the population, all the whites will move out.  Once 
this happens, no white will be willing to move into the neighborhood.   
Schelling’s analysis focused on racial preferences, but is easily extendable to 
preferences over economic status.  For instance, people might like living in mixed 
income neighborhoods, but don’t like feeling too poor. This assumption could be 
formalized by assuming that people do not want to be in the poorest 10
th of the 
neighborhood income distribution.
8   In this case, any neighborhood will eventually 
unravel: as the poorest leave, the distribution shifts, leaving a new group of people in the 
position of being “too poor” for the neighborhood. As succeeding groups of people leave, 
eventually all that is left is a group of people with exactly the same income.  The city 
                                                 
8 People may vary with their tolerance for being different in a number of ways.  This example is merely 
illustrative.  Such preferences could arise for a variety of very plausible reasons. 
  13becomes completely segregated, despite everyone’s preference for living in mixed-
income neighborhoods.    
In this world, it is people’s preferences for being surrounded by people not too 
unlike themselves that drives segregation.  Focusing on the equilibrium condition, 
however, causes us to loose sight of the process by which such an equilibrium is reached.  
We could assume, stupidly, that people in these neighborhoods do annual analyses of 
their neighbors’ tax records so that they can calculate their income percentile, and move 
immediately if the calculation comes out poorly.  If people fold back the model, they will 
realize that any variation in income within the neighborhood (perhaps because someone 
got a raise) will instantaneously cause everyone in the neighborhood except the richest 
person to move away.
9  The neighborhood would instantly be repopulated by people 
moving out of neighborhoods for which they are no longer rich enough. 
This is clearly nonsense.  It is, however, the implicit assumption we make if we 
interpret income mixing in our decennial census as representing a meaningful estimate of 
equilibrium economic integration. 
More realistically, people notice the cars getting nicer, the shops and restaurants 
getting more expensive, the church services getting more boring, and eventually leave 
because there is something they don’t like about “the way the neighborhood has gone.”  
If people also dislike being around people much poorer than themselves, the logic works 
in the opposite way: slowly, people realize that the percent of domestic cars on the street 
is increasing, the shops sell only inferior goods and the crime rate and amount of litter is 
                                                 
9 Or, if people do not wish to seem too poor or too rich, only the person with the income closest to the 
average or median income would want to stay. 
  14increasing.  It becomes harder to get a good nap during church on Sundays.  They leave, 
eventually, because they feel like the neighborhood “took a wrong turn” sometime back. 
The intervening years could be quite long and tedious, as residents go to council 
meetings, form organizations to deal with the changes, or simply take a long time to 
realize what is happening.  The Schelling model suggests they will eventually give up 
and leave, or force the intruding group out,
10 but this equilibrium behavior occurs only in 
the long run. In the short run, there will be large amounts of mixing as the group of 
previous residents grapples with the reality of the intruding group.  If it takes us more 
than, say, ten years to get from the short run to the long run, our estimates of income 
mixing from census counts are guaranteed to be contaminated by disequilibrium 
behavior. 
C) Tiebout and public expenditure clubs. 
Tiebout’s model of public good provision was a brilliant simplification which 
brought out essential elements of the forces at work in urban areas.  The basic idea is that 
if there are enough jurisdictions in a metro area, there are no external effects and 
commuting is not an issue, people will move to jurisdictions that provide their preferred 
level of public services, and these public services will be provided efficiently, as in a 
market for private goods.  People will sort into jurisdictions according to their 
preferences for the provision of these locally provided public goods. 
The analysis need not end there.  Any other kind of amenity could be 
reinterpreted in a similar way, whether locally provided or exogenously determined.   
Although this sort of extension is usually made to the Alonso model of the mono-centric 
                                                 
10 The history of Hyde Park, Illinois provides an example of how this can be done. 
  15city,
11 I discuss it here because amenity sorting can be seen as a generalization of the 
Tiebout model, which focuses on one type of amenity: locally provided public goods.  
Amenities may be provided by a jurisdictional government according to some technology 
(low crime rates, clean streets) or exist independently of local government activity 
(location near a lake, or away from the tanneries).  The central idea of Tiebout sorting – 
and of the generalized amenity version of the Alonso model – is that people sort 
according to their preferences for various location-specific qualities, some of which are 
inherent to the location and some of which are decided through a complicated process of 
politics and intra-metropolitan residential migration.  
If we make a further assumption that people’s preference for such location-
specific characteristics is related to their income, the Tiebout model and the extended 
Alonso model both predict strong sorting by income.  If willingness to pay for public 
expenditures or other amenities are correlated only to income, jurisdictions with different 
levels of the amenity or public service will attract different populations of residents, 
based on their incomes.  Once equilibrium is reached, tax levels and land prices (not to 
mention zoning laws) will have adjusted to make it non-optimal for people of other 
income classes to move into the jurisdiction.
12  Because of inter-jurisdictional 
competition, if there is a mixed income neighborhood, its residents will find it beneficial 
to move away in search of jurisdictions that are better-suited to their tastes/income.   
Now, of course, tastes for amenities and public services are related to more than 
just income: poor people with large families may in principle be willing to pay as much 
                                                 
11 See Diamond and Tolley (1982) for a rigorous version of the model in the context of the monocentric 
city. 
12 The real Tiebout model says much more than this brief synopsis.  We avoid the aspects of his model 
which deal with the optimal response of city managers.  
  16for good schools as rich people with small families.  In uni-dimensional amenity space, 
with few jurisdictions, this could lead to income mixing.  However, in a world with many 
different amenities and many kinds of public spending, and in which residents of a metro 
area have choices between large numbers of jurisdictions (and near continuous choice 
over most amenities), it seems unlikely that much mixing will exist in the long run. 
To demonstrate how mixing will be apparent in the short run even when it is 
unstable in the long run, we imagine a small, monocentric town with three jurisdictions 
(A, B, C) and 300 residents, 100 of whom begin the period rich, while the other 200 of 
them are poor.  We begin the story with a stable situation in which Tiebout sorting has 
already taken place: all the rich residents live together in jurisdiction A, with high levels 
of public services, while the two hundred poor residents live in the other two jurisdictions 
(B, C).  All three jurisdictions have the same access to the small down-town area, and the 
populations of the two poor jurisdictions are identical. 
Now, imagine that a small factory or call center is opened in the CBD able to hire 
100 low-skill laborers in high-wage manufacturing jobs.  The poor people who are able to 
obtain one of these positions will become middle class, while the rest remain poor in their 
old jobs.  Since there is no difference between the populations of the two poor 
jurisdictions, we can expect about fifty poor people from each jurisdiction to be hired, 
propelling them into the middle class.  In the short term, we have two jurisdictions 
exhibiting substantial income mixing: middle-class workers are as likely to live with poor 
people as they are to live with their own kind. 
What is the likely long-term effect of this change in the income distribution?  The 
Tiebout model suggests that the new middle class laborers will want to have higher levels 
  17of public services than their poor neighbors, and will choose to move into one of the two 
poor jurisdictions (B), forcing the poor residents of B to move in with the poor residents 
left behind in C.  These poor migrants will be grateful they did so, as they would not be 
willing to pay the high taxes the middle class residents of B will prefer. 
The model does not specify the process of transition.  It would be consistent with 
the model to assume that the mayors of the two jurisdictions get together and play rock-
paper-scissors to decide who gets to keep the new middle class residents and who gets 
stuck with the poor people.  The next day, or perhaps later that afternoon, fleets of 
moving trucks arrive at the resultant residences to truck the migrants’ possessions into 
either the middle-class or poor jurisdiction, as the case may be.  As ridiculous as this 
scenario sounds, it is essentially what we are assuming if we take cross-sectional 
neighborhood income distributions as representing stable, long-run equilibria. 
A more realistic story entails a long process of newly middle class residents of 
each jurisdiction becoming dissatisfied with the public service provision in their 
jurisdiction.  In the jurisdiction where they make up a bare majority (due to random 
chance, assume it is jurisdiction B) they are able to use political means to increase taxes 
and service levels, but this will take time.  Poor residents of B may try to prevent these 
tax and service increases, and may mount efforts for tax relief on a periodic basis.  It may 
be a long time – several election cycles – before they finally realize that the tax changes 
are effectively permanent and decide to relocate to jurisdiction C.   In jurisdiction C, 
middle-class residents may try increasing taxes through political means several times 
before finally giving up and moving to B.  By the time poor residents in B and middle-
class residents in C realize that a move is both beneficial and inevitable, many years may 
  18have passed.  Even at that point, the counter-directional migration may take several years 
as potential migrants wait for houses to come up for sale.  A constraint on the resources 
available to undertake moves may also slow down the adjustment process, even after the 
lengthy period in which people realize the necessity of the move. 
It is hard to say exactly how long it will take the short run, disequilibrium mixing 
evident in the above illustration to transition into the long-run, equilibrium sorting the 
model predicts.  It could take several election cycles and even then may happen only 
gradually.  However, it is important to stress that, if this transition period lasts any longer 
than about ten years, our assessments of income mixing from census data will be 
guaranteed to be contaminated by disequilibrium mixing. 
D) Comments on these models. 
The above sketches are extremely unsatisfactory because none offer fully worked-
out models of the system or dynamics they describe.  They are offered to motivate the 
empirical section to follow, and to offer some intuitive support for three seminal articles 
in the face of empirical and theoretical challenges based on simplified, static 
interpretations of the models.  By considering the dynamics of changing equilibria in the 
real world, it becomes evident that income mixing in neighborhoods is evidence against 
these models only if we believe the neighborhood has reached equilibrium.   
One final remark seems in order about the difference between racial and 
economic segregation.  Racial segregation is extremely high in America, and the 
Schelling model seems to capture some important stylized facts about the process of 
neighborhood change in racial composition.  One reason why this might be is that 
equilibrium is reached faster in the case of racial segregation than in the case of economic 
  19segregation.  This might be because it is almost impossible not to know the race of your 
neighbor.  Thus, if people have racial preferences, they are easily acted upon.  If race is 
used by people as a proxy for other things that mater more (e.g. criminality), then the 
accuracy of this proxy is not as important as the fact that it is extremely visible and easily 
verifiable.  Once several black families move into a neighborhood, it is (and was) easy 
for uncomfortable white residents to “fold back” and figure out what is going to happen.  
Thus, equilibrium is reached quickly. 
On the other hand, economic preferences (if they exist) are much harder to act 
upon because the economic status of a neighbor is harder to verify.  Income is also an 
important correlate of many other important qualities, such as demand for public and 
private goods and services.  The way in which income works is thus not directly, but 
through reasonably complicated market effects: through changing rent gradients, shifting 
retail mixes and a slow and poorly-understood public choice mechanism.  Such changes 
will take far longer to be obvious to residents, be harder to verify and less readily folded 
back.  This does not mean the concept of equilibrium is not valid in these situations, it 
just means that it will take longer to reach, and will be reached somewhat less 
consciously by its participants.   
 
III. A More Formal Model.
13
This section lays out a simple sketch of neighborhood change.  The model is 
purely mechanical.  Its purpose is to show that the instability of mixed income 
neighborhoods – as derived by Tiebout, Alonso and Schelling – has certain implications, 
                                                 
13 This theoretical sketch concerns itself with deriving some additional results that are not the focus of the 
empirical section.  Impatient readers may reasonably skip this section without serious loss of continuity.   
  20so that those implications can be used as a guide for the empirical section to follow.  We 
assume a very simple income distribution: inci = {0, 1}.
14  A neighborhood’s average 
income in time period t, is thus simply the proportion of the neighborhood’s population 
that are in the higher income group:  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ t x , and the neighborhood variance in income 
is  () t t t x x − = 1 σ . 
To represent the instability of mixed income neighborhoods, we assume that each 
neighborhood has an equilibrium use dictating that it be inhabited by only rich or poor 
people, and we assume that neighborhoods will move towards this equilibrium: 
1)  ()
**
1 tt t x xx x α − −= − − e  , 
where  1 0 < ≤α  and the disturbance term et is distributed with mean zero and a finite 
standard deviation that is small relative to the range of neighborhood average incomes.  
For expositional purposes, we will focus our attention on neighborhoods with equilibrium 
income x* = 0.  These neighborhoods will be described as “declining” neighborhoods, 
since their average incomes will generally be declining when the disturbance terms are 
small.  For such neighborhoods, equation 1 is more conveniently rewritten as: 
2)  t t t e x x + = −1 α . 
The [0,1] range on xt is an absorption barrier, so that large magnitude disturbances in 
drive neighborhood average income to one or zero, but not past.  However, we assume 
that the spread of the disturbance term is small enough that such absorption is relatively 
uncommon.  The analysis will focus on the set of neighborhood average incomes for 
                                                 
14 This simple distribution generalizes to any two incomes, which can be thought of as “before” and “after” 
incomes.  The assumption in the model will thus be that neighborhoods tend towards a perfectly segregated 
equilibrium. 
  21which no neighborhood reaches the barrier due to extreme disturbances.
15  The parameter 
α captures the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium.  The naïve interpretation of the 
fundamental models implicitly assumes that α = 0: that neighborhoods instantly reach 
equilibrium and that cross-sectional analysis thus yields meaningful estimates of 
equilibrium income mixing.  Over very long time periods with very rare changes in 
equilibrium use this may be a reasonable assumption, but over the ten year horizon 
offered by census data, it would seem less reasonable.  Neighborhood transitions take 
time, and are common.  On the other hand, α = 1 implies that neighborhood incomes (and 
thus neighborhood income mixing) are stable at any level: there is no trend towards some 
other equilibrium level.  We will follow Tiebout, Alonso and Schelling and assume that 
α<1.  The results below focus on the case of a declining neighborhood, but all the results 
hold qualitatively for the case of gentrifying neighborhoods. 
  With these very simple dynamics, it is possible to show some key patterns.  The 
first is that, on average, the variance in neighborhood income will be falling over time, or 
that σt<σt-1.  To see when this would be the case, we express the inequality in terms of the 
same parameters: 
3)  () ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − = − < − − + = t t t t t t t t x x e x e x σ α α σ . 
Some algebraic manipulations yield: 





2 2 1 1
−
− − − + − − < − t t t t t x e e e x α α α , 
                                                 
15 Including the excluded neighborhoods into the analysis complicates matters considerably.  Their 
inclusion would weaken the first result, but should have no effect on the second two results.  The results 
thus hold for the broad middle of neighborhoods, but not for neighborhoods having already reached the 
extremes of the income distribution. 
  22which does not yield immediately to analysis because the relationship will depend on the 
disturbance term.  However, taking the expectation of each side (across neighborhoods) 
yields a more manageable relationship: 
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This says that, on average, neighborhood income variance will be decreasing with time as 
long as average income in the earlier period is below a threshold level that depends on the 
speed of adjustment plus a positive term involving the disturbance term.  The first term 
on the r.h.s. represents the “deterministic” part of the relationship between prior and 
subsequent variances in income, while the second term represents the contribution of the 
random disturbances to the changes in standard deviation.  This second term implies that, 
even if there were no deterministic trend in neighborhood income variance (if α = 1), the 
random noise in the system will create a declining trend.  This is an important factor to 
which we will return in the empirical section. 
It is instructive to focus on the deterministic portion of this system by assuming 
the disturbance term is identical to zero.  The deterministic part of the threshold ranges 
from one (when α = 0) to a little over ½ (as α approaches 1).  For a given value of α, 
neighborhoods with higher incomes will gain in income variance, while lower incomes 
will experience declines in income.  This is a result of the non-monotonic relationship 
between average income and income variance.  Since this result describes neighborhoods 
with incomes declining towards an equilibrium income x* = 0, it is likely that the average 
xt-1 will be below ½, so that inequality 5 holds.  A parallel result holds for gentrifying 
neighborhoods.  This result means that, on average, neighborhoods should be observed to 
lose income variance over time. 
  23  Another result of this basic set-up is that larger changes in average income will be 
associated with larger subsequent levels of income mixing, or neighborhood income 
variance.  In other words, if we observe highly mixed neighborhoods, it is likely the case 
that this mix is the result of neighborhood transition rather than evidence of a stable 
mixed-income neighborhood.  To show this result, we note that equation one implies that 
() α / 1 t t t e x x − = −  and that the change in neighborhood average income,  1 − − = ∆ t t t x x x .  
We substitute xt-1 into ∆xt and solve this equation for xt, yielding an equation for current 
period average income in terms of the change in average income, the disturbance term 
and α.  Plugging this equation into the formula for neighborhood income variance gives 
the following equation: 


































t t t t t t t t
t t t
e x e x e x e x
x x  
Because this equation holds for declining neighborhoods, and we are interested in the 
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We are interested in the relationship between income variance and the change in average 
income, so we evaluate when 






















which reduces to 
                                                 
16 Equation 7 assumes that the change in average income is negative in degentrifying neighborhoods, which 
will be true for a large majority of such neighborhoods.  Very extreme, positive disturbance terms could 
occasionally cause degntrifying neighborhoods to experience temporary increases in income, in which case 
the results derived below would not hold.     
  249)  () 1 2 − > ∆ − α α t t x e . 
This inequality is difficult to evaluate because it depends upon the disturbance term.  






2 t x E . 
  Thus, on average, greater neighborhood change will be associated with greater 
subsequent income mixing whenever the expected magnitude in the change in income is 
less than a threshold which depends on the speed of transition.  This threshold is again 
picking up the non-monotonic relationship between average income and income variance.  
Will the inequality hold?  We can use the deterministic part of the relationship between 
previous period average income and changes in average income to get a sense for the 
validity of this inequality.  The lower α, the more easily inequality 10 will be satisfied.  
For instance, if α = ½ or less, inequality 10 holds for any average previous-period income 
less than one.
17  As α increases towards unity, the r.h.s. of inequality 10 decreases, but so 
does the l.h.s. (because the expected change will be less when α is closer to one).   
However, the l.h.s. does not decrease as quickly, so that for higher α, average incomes 
must be lower (thus reducing further the expected change in income).  If α = 2/3, at least 
a quarter of residents must be poor (xt-1<.75) for the inequality to hold.  For α equaling ¾ 
and 9/10, at least one third or four ninths of the neighborhood must be poor, respectively.  
No value of α<1 requires more than half of the residents of the neighborhood be poor for 
inequality 10 to hold.  Because this result concerns neighborhoods with incomes 
declining towards x* = 0, it is likely that these neighborhoods will have average incomes 
                                                 
17 We know this because if α = ½ the r.h.s. of inequality 10 equals 1, while E( |∆xt| ) = αE(xt-1), which 
cannot be greater than ½ when α = ½.  
  25less than ½, so that inequality 10 holds.  A parallel result holds for gentrifying 
neighborhoods.  This result means that on average neighborhoods experiencing large 
changes in average income will also be observed to have more income mixing. 
  A final result concerns the relationship between previous-period income mixing 
and subsequent changes in neighborhood average income.  We might expect this 
relationship to hold in reality because if mixed income neighborhoods are unstable, 
highly mixed neighborhoods will be likely candidates for rapid demographic shifts as 
either rich or poor flee the neighborhood.  In our highly stylized model, we show this by 
expressing the magnitude change in average income in terms of the previous-period 
variance in income.  First we must rewrite the formula for neighborhood income 
variance. 
11)  () ( )
2
1 1 1 1 5 . 25 . 1 − − = − = − − − − t t t t x x x σ . 
This formulation is valid for the range of xt-1.  Unfortunately, solving equation 11 for xt-1 
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Because  () t t t t t e x x x x + − = − = ∆ − − 1 1 1 α , it is possible to express the derivative of the 
absolute change in average income with respect to the beginning period variance in 
income. 











































The signs are implied by equation 13, the fact that the first quotient is negative for 
declining neighborhoods (for the average disturbance term) and the fact that (α-1)<0.  
Again, the importance of previous period income on the sign of the result comes from the 
non-monotonic relationship between average income and income variance.   
What the result says is that for richer declining neighborhoods, high variance will 
be associated with smaller changes in average income, but that in poorer declining 
neighborhoods high variance will be associated with larger changes in income.  Because 
these results concern neighborhoods trendening towards x* = 0, it seems reasonable that 
the majority of them would start the period with xt-1 < ½, so that the average effect (for 
declining neighborhoods) would reflect the results for poor neighborhoods more closely 
than the results for richer neighborhoods.  A parallel result holds for gentrifying 
neighborhoods so that the average effect of mixing on subsequent income changes will be 
positive. 
It is important to be clear about what has just been done.  The above schematic of 
neighborhood dynamics is purely mechanical.  The model as laid out makes no 
behavioral assumptions: these assumptions were laid down over 30 years ago by Tiebout, 
Alonso and Schelling.  Nor does the model tell us what happens to real neighborhoods in 
real cities: that is an empirical matter.  What the model does is take a reasonable 
representation of the Tiebout, Alonso and Schelling models (that neighborhoods will tend 
to move towards their equilibrium use), and show that allowing for a gradual transition 
towards equilibrium (α > 0) should cause some regularities to be observed in the data.  
  27Note that if mixed income neighborhoods could be sustained (α = 1), the last two results 
would not hold.
18
The above sketch of neighborhood dynamics has also offered some insight into 
the types of variables we might seek to account for in the empirical treatment below.  In 
the results above, the sign of the relationship usually depended on previous period 
average income and on α.  Thus when implementing the model empirically, we will want 
to control for previous-period income and factors that might affect the stability of a 
neighborhood.  The results above also depend on essentially zeroing out the error terms.  
While this is fair if we assume that the error term is uncorrelated with any other variable 
in the analysis, in actuality it is quite possible that such demographic shocks could be 
correlated with other variables, and so we will need to control for such factors as best we 
can.   
 
IV. Empirical Model. 
  To asses the stability of mixed income neighborhoods in American cities, I 
conceptualize neighborhoods as behaving according to a partial adjustment model similar 
to that in section III, but with a focus on income mixing instead of income levels.  This 
model assumes that each neighborhood has an equilibrium level of mixing, which we 
cannot observe, and that as time passes the neighborhood approaches this level of mixing, 
but experiences random shocks along the way.  In symbols, this idea is expressed as: 
15)  ()
*
11 it it it it σ σα σ σ −− ′ =+ − + ε
                                                
. 
 
18 The first result, that variance will decline on average in any neighborhood, would still hold in the 
presence of the random disturbance term.  However, purging this relationship of the random component 
would create a situation in which the neighborhood variance in income does not change from period to 
period.  The purgation of the random disturbances is an issue taken up in the empirical section.   
  28In equation 15, σ is a measure of within-neighborhood income mixing.  The indexes i and 
t index neighborhoods and time, respectively, εit represents the random shock to income 
mixing that neighborhood i experiences at time t and α´  represents the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium (the proportion of the difference between previous period 
income mixing and the equilibrium level of mixing that the adjustment process eliminates 
during a time period).
19   
Another way to write equation one that brings out the intuition a bit better is: 
16)   ()
*
11 it it it it it σ σσ α σσ ε −− ′ ∆=− = − + . 
In equation 16, we look at the situation in terms of changes in the neighborhood’s income 
diversity.  It says that changes in income mixing will be related to how far from the 
equilibrium level of mixing the neighborhood was in previous periods.  If α´ were one, it 
would mean that every period the neighborhood gets back to its long run equilibrium, 
ignoring the random shocks it would experience.  If α´ were zero, it would mean that 
there is no tendency for neighborhoods to move towards some other value.  In such a case 
the concept of the “equilibrium” represented by 
* σ  would be meaningless: there is no 
adjustment, and the current level (in time t or t-1) is essentially the equilibrium, both in 
the short and the long run sense. 
  I interpret the idea of stable income mixing as being represented by α´ = 0 (or 1-α´ 
= 1).  This implies that there is no adjustment towards any equilibrium, and the time path 
of neighborhood income mixing follows what is called a “random walk” dominated 
completely by unpredictable shocks.  The idea of a random walk is not usually associated 
                                                 
19  The relationship between α and α´ is complicated.  While the exact functional form is not worked out 
here, I can say that α will be positively related to (1-α´).  Thus, the “naïve” interpretation of Alonso, 
Tiebout and Schelling (α = 0) corresponds to (1-α´) =0 (or α´=1) and the “stable neighborhood incomes 
and mixing” assumption (α = 1) corresponds to (1-α´) =1 (or α´=0). 
  29with stability.
20  This, however, is the most policy-relevant view of the stability of mixed 
income neighborhoods.  If α´ = 0, and income mixing can be increased in a neighborhood 
(e.g. through a policy intervention), that increase in neighborhood mixing will persist into 
the future, not dissipate over time.  The “no adjustment” model (α = 0) means that 
today’s level of income mixing is essentially equilibrium.  The naïve view focuses 
instead on a neighborhood’s ability to achieve the new equilibrium extremely quickly and 
is represented by the “complete adjustment” model with α = 1.
21  If the actual level of 
equilibrium mixing is large, then this would represent stable mixing.  Complete 
adjustment means that the level of income mixing is governed by a strict equilibrium, and 
that any movement away from this equilibrium will be corrected within one time period.  
Any additional income mixing achieved by policy intervention will be transitory in the 
extreme.     
  This paper focuses on a slight variation of equation 15: 
15´)  ()
*
1 1 it it it σ ασ α σ ε − ′′ =+ − + . 
Equation 15´ begins to look somewhat like a regression equation.  However, because 
* σ  
is not observed (and is in fact not identified if εit has positive expectation, as we might 
expect when income mixing is defined to be non-negative).  For statistical purposes, a 
number of possible predictors of income mixing levels, X, stand in for it. 
                                                 
20 One problem with random walks in long time series is that the variance of the variable increases to 
infinity as the amount of time approaches infinity.  In the present context with only two time periods, this is 
not too unattractive.  There is no reason why the variance of income mixing cannot be increasing over a ten 
or twenty year time span.  Rosenthal (2008) estimates the relationship between changes in neighborhood 
income over longer time spans and rejects the unit root.  Rosenthal’s result indicates that neighborhoods 
cycle through periods of relative affluence and poverty over very long time periods, but his results do not 
speak to the issue of whether neighborhoods can sustain income mixing around this changing average. 
21 However, such a view does not address what this equilibrium level of mixing is and how it would be 
measured econometrically.  
 
  3017)  () 01 1 it it it X σ ββ α σ ε − =+ + − + . 
It is important to note that factors that increase equilibrium mixing and factors that 
increase the random shocks to neighborhood mixing levels cannot be separately 
identified in this framework since β0 will soak up any non-zero expectation in the error 
term.  Thus, our assessment of the stability of income mixing rests on our estimates of 1 – 
α´, with 1 – α´= 1 representing stability.   
  There are several reasons why we might not trust the OLS estimate of (1-α´).  The 
theoretical sketch in part III of this paper suggested the need for instrumentation through 
the “random” component in equation 5, but there are other reasons to be suspicious.  One 
is measurement error.  If σit-1 is measured with error, then the estimate of (1-α´) will be 
biased towards zero.  It could also be the case that there is serial correlation in the 
neighborhood- and time-specific random shocks (E(εit εit-1)>0).  This would cause σit-1 to 
be correlated with the error term in a regression along the lines of equation 17.  To deal 
with these possibilities, we instrument for σit-1 with σit-2.  Under the assumptions laid out 
above, this procedure gives a consistent estimate of (1-α´). 
  The IV strategy in the previous paragraph will not be appropriate if the serial 
correlation spans more than one period, for instance, if εit is correlated with εit-2.  Such 
correlation could occur if our control variables X in equation 17 do not fully capture 
equilibrium and disequilibrium contributors to neighborhood income mixing so that 
neighborhoods have a neighborhood-specific component of the error term, if there is 
measurement error that is correlated across time periods or if the random shocks are 
correlated across more than one decade.  I use two techniques to deal with this 
possibility.  First, to deal with the possibility of correlated measurement error or longer 
  31time-span serial correlation, I instrument for σit-1 with a battery of t-2 predictors of σit-2 
(such as median income and neighborhood demographics).  I also estimate equation 17 in 
differences to eliminate any neighborhood-specific unobserved effects.  In such a 
differencing strategy, the lagged difference will be correlated with the error term by 
construction, so in all these models I instrument for the lagged difference in income 
mixing (σit-1  - σit-2) with either the twice-lagged level of income mixing (σit-2) or the 
predictors of σit-2  mentioned  above.    As the results of any instrumental variables 
estimation hinge entirely on the validity of the assumptions used to justify the 
instruments, the results section below will present results from a variety of IV strategies, 
with different variables included or excluded in the second stage equation. 
V.   Data. 
  An estimation of equations 17 requires panel data on neighborhood 
demographics.  Until recently, such data was not available because the census changes 
tract boundaries for each census.  This paper uses proprietary data compiled by Geolytics 
which use GIS programs to compute old census demographic information in census tracts 
and block groups as they were drawn in the 2000  Census.  This allows for the 
comparison of an area’s demographics across time.  We use the census block group as 
our unit of analysis because Coulton et al. (2004) find that census block groups most 
closely match their respondents’ conception of their own “neighborhood,” at least in their 
sample which included only residents of dense urban neighborhoods.   
  The most natural measure of neighborhood income mixing would be the within-
neighborhood standard deviation of income.  This measure, however, is extremely 
strongly correlated with average income.  To mitigate this issue, I use four different 
  32measures of income mixing.  The first is simply the log of the standard deviation of 
income within a neighborhood (lnσ).  This measure is not as correlated with median 
income, and its distribution is not as skewed as raw standard deviation of income.  The 
next measure I examine is the coefficient of variation of income (CoVa), which is the 
standard deviation divided by the average (in this case, it is divided by the median 
income, not the average).  This measure is not as skewed as the standard deviation.  It 
also reports income spread as a proportion of the central value of the neighborhood 
income distribution.  This is desirable since it might be the case that at high incomes a 
dollar’s difference between neighbors’ incomes does not count as much as at lower 
incomes.  However, because median income enters directly into the calculation of this 
measure, a correlation with median income persists (although it is smaller in absolute 
value than the correlation between neighborhood standard deviation and median income).  
  As both the above measures (lnσ and CoVa) are correlated with median income, 
there are potential problems in the interpretation of the variables.  Do changes in them 
represent changes in mixing or changes in medians?  I also run models using the 
standardized residuals from regressions of standard deviation of income and CoVa on 
contemporaneous median income.  By construction, these variables (σ-resi and CoVa-
resi) have mean of zero, standard deviation of one and are completely uncorrelated with 
median income.      
  The rest of the variables used in the analysis attempt to capture the possible 
equilibrium level of mixing or random shocks to income mixing.  First, each metropolitan 
area has developed along its own history, guided by state and local policies specific to it, 
and each possessing its own culture and constraints.  These metropolitan-specific factors 
  33could influence the equilibrium level of mixing in a neighborhood, or the amount of 
random disturbance to neighborhoods.  To eliminate this possibility, every regression 
reported in this paper (including the most parsimonious and the regressions in 
differences) contains 264 metropolitan fixed effects.  Two more important variables, 
included in most of the regressions, are the block group’s median income relative to the 
median income of the average block group in a metropolitan area (Income) and the 
magnitude of the change in neighborhood median income over the preceding decade, 
relative to the metropolitan average change, and standardized to the metropolitan income 
increases (Rel-∆Income).
22  Rel-∆Income is meant to capture either gentrification or 
neighborhood deterioration, and is always greater than zero. 
   Additional variables meant to capture differences in the equilibrium amount of 
mixing or random disturbance include neighborhood demographic characteristics, 
housing characteristics and geographic factors.  The demographic factors included are the 
proportion of the BG population that is college educated (College); the proportion that 
are high school drop outs (DropOut); proportion of households with children (Children); 
proportion white, non-Hispanic (White); proportion of families with at least one working 
adult in residence (Workers); percent of families below 150% of the official poverty line 
(Poverty); and the proportion of households living in the same house as five years prior to 
the census in question (Stayers).  Housing characteristics include the owner occupancy 
rate (Owners), the median year of construction of neighborhood residences (YearBuilt), 
the residential population density and its square (Density and Density
2) and the median 
                                                 
22 Rel∆Income = 0 signifies income growth in the neighborhood was exactly the same as income growth in 
the metropolitan area.  Rel∆Income = 1 signifies that neighborhood income growth was twice as fast as the 
metropoliktan area’s groth, or zero (100% more or less than metropolitan growth).  Rel∆Income = .5 
signifies income growth about 150% or 50% as fast as the average block group in the metropolitan area.   
  34value of residential housing units and its square (Value and Value
2).  The geographic 
component is the log of the linear distance to the nearest historic center of a populated 
place as defined by the National Atlas (Distance).
23  When these variables vary with time 
(as is the case for all the variables except Distance), they are generally measured at each 
census in 1980, 1990 and 2000, which allows for the empirical strategy described above 
to be implemented.   
The descriptive statistics for each set of variables are presented in Appendix A.  
In passing, note that the average standard deviation of household income in a block group 
is about 34,000, while the standard deviation of the whole country, computed in the same 
way, is about 42,500.  This suggests that on average block groups are more homogenous 
than the country as a whole, although they exhibit substantial heterogeneity: by 
Jargowsky’s index, only 20 percent of income variance comes across block-group, as 
opposed to within block groups.  Without further delay, we can move to the results. 
 
VI.   Main Results. 
  Tables 1-3 present the results for each of the measures of income mixing 
described above.  These tables present only the coefficients on the primary variables: 
income mixing, and relative levels and changes in median income.  For the most part, the 
coefficients on the other control variables have easily interpretable signs.  These results 
are available from the author on request. 
                                                 
23 This measure is meant to capture commuting time, or the rent gradient associated with longer commutes 
from the Alonso/Muth model.  These distances are not to the central metropolitan CBD, but to the center of 
any populated place.  This allows cities to have multiple employment centers.  More information on the 
places used can be found at:   http://nationalatlas.gov/mld/citiesx.html . 
  35  Table 1 reports the results on the three primary variables of interest under very 
optimistic assumptions of no endogeneity in levels or differences.  Models I-IV report 
OLS results, while columns V-VIII report results of simple OLS models run on the 
differences of all the variables.
24  Panels A, B, C and D report the results for the four 
different measures of income mixing (lnσ, CoVa, σ-resi and CoVa-resi, respectively).  
The results are consistent across all four measures.  In levels, the relationship between 
current and lagged income mixing is greater than zero but significantly less than one in 
every case.  The first difference results theoretically give estimates of the same 
parameter, but these coefficients are uniformly negative and significant.  However, as 
discussed above, it is not appropriate to interpret these coefficients as representing the 
relationship laid out in the empirical model.  If one views this evidence cross-sectionally, 
however, it can be taken as meaning that neighborhoods that had unexpectedly large 
increases in income mixing one decade tend to have unexpectedly large decreases in 
income mixing the next.  In the sense of a conditional average, this statement is a true 
description of the situation, but can only be taken so far in light of the econometric issues 
raised above.
25   
  Table 2 presents a variety of regressions which attempt to deal with the 
endogeneity plaguing the results of Table 1 through the application of instrumental 
variables.  Columns I-IV present results using 1980 levels of income mixing as the 
instrument.  Columns V-VIII present results using 1980 levels of correlates of income 
mixing as instruments in a Two Stage Least Squares estimation.  These estimates rely on 
                                                 
24 Running such a regression is not appropriate in this context because of the dynamic nature of the model.  
These results are presented only for discussion. 
25 The results in columns V-VIII also imply that areas that had unexpectedly large decreases in income 
mixing in one decade will have unexpectedly large increases in income mixing the next.   
  36the validity of the omission of these 1980 neighborhood demographic characters from the 
equation predicting year 2000 income mixing.  However, these models usually fail 
overidentification tests quite spectacularly.
26  This is because neighborhoods are highly 
dynamic, and past conditions probably have a present effect on outcomes, even after 
more than a decade. 
  The rest of Table 2 attempts to address this problem through less severe 
assumptions.  The remaining columns revert to the IV strategy of columns I-IV, but 
control for 1980 neighborhood demographics and housing characteristics (columns IX-
XII).  Columns XIII, XIV and XV add 1990 neighborhood demographics and housing 
characteristics to the set of controls.   While the validity of the instrument cannot be 
formally tested, including the battery of 1980 and 1990 neighborhood characteristics as 
included instruments makes the exclusion restriction more plausible.  
  The results for these instrumental variables regressions are not as consistent 
across mixing measures, but a few general comments can be made.  First, generally, the 
coefficients on lagged income mixing are significantly positive and less than one.   
Second, the addition of the control variables (year 2000 demographics and housing 
characteristics) tends to pull the coefficient on lagged income mixing downward, towards 
zero.  This is especially true for the coefficient of variation based measures (CoVa and 
CoVa-resi).  While there are several individual mixing coefficients that are equal to or 
greater than one (for CoVa-resi and lnσ), these instances happen only in the first eight 
columns with the naïve IV and 2SLS strategies, which are suspect in terms of 
consistency.  The coefficients for both these variables come down significantly below 
                                                 
26 The p-value on the overidentification test (using Hansens J-statistic) are all less than 0.001.  However, 
this is partly being driven by large sample size.  There exist randomly drawn sample sizes where the 
coefficients in the second stage retain their significance but the models pass this test. 
  37one in the final eight columns of Table 2, where we can be more confident in the 
estimation strategy. 
  Table 3 reports results based on difference equations, which theoretically estimate 
the same coefficient.  As was discussed above, there is a built-in negative relationship 
between current and lagged changes in any variable.  The estimates in table 3 correct for 
this in a variety of ways.  Columns I-IV instrument for lagged changes in income mixing 
using the 1980 levels of neighborhood demographics and housing characteristics.  These 
specifications fail diagnostic tests for overidentification.
27  The remainder of Table 3 
presents results from models attempting to address this problem.  Columns V-VII use the 
same set of instruments as columns I-IV, but control for a set of lagged changes in the 
second stage equation.  These specifications also fail the test for overidentification.  The 
final columns (VIII-X) use a specification inspired by the final columns of Table 2.   
These specifications revert to a standard instrumental variables approach, using 1980 
income mixing as the instrument, but retaining the array of lagged differences used as 
controls in columns V-VII, and adds the array of 1980 controls (which were instruments 
in the first seven columns of Table 3).  This instrumental variables strategy cannot be 
formally tested, but the large set of included instruments gives the exclusion restriction 
face validity.   
  The results in Table 3 show that every coefficient on the lagged mixing variables 
is significantly less than one.  The somewhat less troubling possibility that the coefficient 
is less than zero is not as easily rejected.  lnσ is significantly less than zero in all of the 
first seven columns.  However, these are the models which produce the most suspect 
estimates.  The results in the final column, with all possible controls, reproduce a very 
                                                 
27 However, as per footnote 26, above, this is partly driven by sample size. 
  38significantly positive coefficient that is consistent with the results for many of the other 
variables and specifications.  The coefficient on CoVa-resi varies around zero in the first 
four columns, even becoming significantly so in one specification (although the 
magnitude of this negative coefficient is tiny compared to those for lnσ).  In the “better” 
specifications of columns V-X, this coefficient stays positive consistently, but not 
significantly.   
  What is the meaning of the over 130 models just reported?  I take these results to 
be strong support of the three canonic models of income segregation in a realistic 
dynamic setting.  Across the models, there can be almost no doubt that the coefficient in 
the regression equations is less than one.  While we may worry that the IV strategy does 
not completely purge the coefficients of endogeneity bias, the range of estimates is so far 
from one that it seems highly unlikely that true relationship approaches one.   Given that 
it is not possible to actually measure the equilibrium level of mixing, we must take our 
evidence from the dynamics of income mixing.  In the context of the partial adjustment 
model described above, the less-than-one coefficient on lagged income mixing signifies 
two things.  First, if a neighborhood strays from equilibrium, it will return towards it 
gradually.  Second, most neighborhoods do not start out in 1990 at equilibrium.  Ideally, 
one would show that this equilibrium adjustment is mainly down-wards, but such a 
demonstration is not possible because there is no way to identify the equilibrium level 
unless one assumes that the random components are mean zero.  Since income mixing 
cannot be negative, it is not likely the case that its random shocks are zero in expectation.  
In such a case, economists are left to theory to interpret the meaning of the average 
amount of mixing.  Does it represent equilibrium forces for mixing or disequilibrium 
  39disturbances?  In the present case, the weight of theory is squarely on the side of 
disequilibrium. The dynamic behavior of mixed income neighborhoods supports this 
conclusion because mixing induced by policy or other means will evaporate over the 
following years.   
  
VII. Additional Results 
The theoretical sketch in section III suggested some additional patterns in the data if 
income mixing is unstable.  The sketch suggested that these relationships as well as the 
one tested in section VI should be conditional on initial levels of income in the 
neighborhood.  It also suggested a positive partial correlation between income mixing 
and subsequent changes in relative income, and a positive relationship between income 
changes and subsequent mixing.    This section discusses these predictions and results in 
broad outlines.  First, I discuss the sensitivity of the results in section VI to the inclusion 
of various interaction terms.  Then, I discuss the relationship between previous changes 
in income and subsequent income mixing, both with and without the interaction terms.  
Finally, I discuss the relationship between previous income mixing and subsequent 
changes in income with and without the interactions.   
A. Adding interactions to the mixing equation.
The theoretical sketch in section III suggested that the relationship between lagged and 
current income mixing is conditioned by a neighborhood’s income level.  In this sub-
section, I discuss a battery of models run with such interactions.  For every full regression 
reported in tables 1-3, I ran parallel models with an interaction between lagged income 
mixing and relative neighborhood income.  I also ran a set of models which included an 
  40interaction between recent neighborhood changes in relative income and lagged income 
mixing, and a set of models which included both these interactions.
28  While these results 
are too numerous to report, I describe the results here to provide a sense of the robustness 
of the results to these changes in specification. 
  The interaction terms are significant in a bit over half the models, but there is not 
a strong pattern in their sign.  Depending on the measure and the identification strategy, 
the sign of the interaction between lagged mixing and relative income switches signs and 
significance.  In the preferred models (using the IV strategy and the full set of controls in 
first differences), this interaction tends to be insignificant.  The interaction between 
lagged income mixing and recent relative changes in neighborhood income is often 
significant and displays a fairly consistent pattern across specifications, especially for the 
residual-based measures.  For the residual-based measures, this interaction is generally 
significant and negative, except in the preferred model, where it is significant and 
positive across all four measures of mixing.  In the models where both interaction terms 
are included, the results in the preferred model back this conclusion up: the interaction 
with changes in neighborhood income is generally significant and positive. Taking these 
results together, it means that the stability of income mixing is not strongly affected by 
pre-existing income levels, but is increasing in changes in income.   
  The substantive importance of these interactions in terms of affecting the stability 
of mixed income neighborhoods is minimal.  Although neighborhoods experiencing 
larger changes in relative income are more stable (in terms of income mixing), the 
combined effect of lagged mixing on current mixing is almost always significantly less 
                                                 
28 In the IV models, twice-lagged interactions were used as instruments for the interaction terms.  In the 
2SLS models, the same vector of 1980 predictors of 1980 income mixing served as excluded instruments 
for the interaction terms. 
  41than one.  This means that across all neighborhood types (high- and low-income, stable 
and quickly changing), income mixing gained in one period tends to erode over ensuing 
time periods.  In some cases and for some types of neighborhoods, the total effect is 
insignificantly different from zero, meaning that any additional income mixing induced in 
one period will disappear entirely over the ensuing decade.  However, these zero effects 
occur only for very limited ranges of neighborhood types, and never in the preferred 
specification.  The general message of this sub-section is thus that the results reported in 
section VI are extremely robust to the inclusion of interaction terms in the specification.   
B. Income changes relationship to subsequent mixing.  
The relationship between previous changes in income levels and subsequent 
income mixing in the absence of any interactive effects can be seen in tables 1-3.  There, 
we see that the un-interacted relationship is generally positive as hypothesized except for 
the residual-based standard deviation measure (σ-resi), which is generally negative and 
significant.  Furthermore, in the final column of table 3, for the lnσ measure of income 
mixing, the coefficient on income changes is significantly negative.  Because this last 
column represents the preferred model, this switch is significant.  The pattern which 
emerges is that standard-deviation-based measures of income mixing decrease with 
neighborhood income changes, while coefficient-of-variation-based measures increase 
with these changes.  The addition of the interaction term between previous period relative 
income and income mixing does not alter this pattern: lnσ and σ-resi fail to support the 
pattern suggested in section III, while CoVa and CoVa-resi do exhibit that pattern.   
  When we add an interaction between relative income changes and lagged income 
mixing, the results become more complicated because the effect of income changes on 
  42subsequent mixing will now depend on pre-existing levels of income mixing.  The sign of 
this interaction term is somewhat unstable, but as discussed above, tends towards the 
positive, especially in the preferred specification.  This means that neighborhood income 
changes lead to more mixing the more mixed a neighborhood is to begin with.  For the 
non-residual-based measures (in the preferred specification), this interactive effect is 
enough to change the total effect of income changes from significantly negative to 
significantly positive (in the range of the data).  However, for the two residual-based 
measures, the pattern form the un-interacted results persists: σ-resi is affected negatively 
by income changes and CoVa-resi is affected positively, whatever the pre-existing level 
of income mixing. 
  These results are interesting for a number of reasons.  First, the significance of the 
interaction terms suggests that the effects income changes (gentrification of de-
gentrification) on mixing depend on the amount of income mixing that exists before the 
changes occur.  Such heterogeneous effects suggest that a rich and complicated process 
drives (and is driven by) neighborhood change.  Furthermore, the heterogeneity of results 
across mixing measures – with the coefficient-of-variation-based measures supporting the 
theory and the standard-deviation-based measures undermining it – suggest that income 
mixing itself is an extremely rich and difficult-to-measure characteristic of 
neighborhoods.  In and of itself, the difficulty in measuring income mixing will be an 
important barrier to any successful policy meant to encourage income mixing. 
C. Mixing’s relationship with subsequent income changes.
Models were also run with relative change in neighborhood income from 1990 to 
2000 as the dependent variable to detect whether the hypothesized positive relationship 
  43between previous income mixing and subsequent changes in income was borne out in the 
data.
29  In the models run without interactions, the strength of these relationships depends 
on the measure of income mixing used and the specification.  Using simple OLS 
estimation, the hypothesized positive relationship exists for all measures except lnσ, 
which has negative insignificant coefficients.  As we move to instrumental variable and 
two-stage least squares strategies similar to those used in the income mixing equations, 
this pattern generally persists, with positive effects for all measures of mixing except lnσ, 
but sometimes these positive coefficients drop into insignificance for σ-resi.   
  The theoretical sketch suggested that this positive relationship should be 
conditioned by previous period income of the neighborhood.  I ran models predicting 
neighborhood income change that included the interaction between lagged mixing and 
lagged relative neighborhood income, both in OLS and using IV and 2SLS strategies 
similar to those used in the mixing regressions.  The negative effects of lagged lnσ on 
subsequent income changes persists through the distribution of neighborhood incomes.  
The total effects of σ-resi display significant heterogeneity across estimation strategies, 
although all of them include substantial ranges of pre-existing incomes that yield positive 
total effects of mixing on subsequent income changes.  For the CoVa and Cova-res 
measures of income mixing, the total effect is strongly positive and significant for most 
specifications across the entire range of pre-existing relative income levels, although 
there is some heterogeneity of effects.  These results suggest again that the simple 
theoretical sketch is better-supported by the coefficient of variation measures than the 
standard deviation measures.  The heterogeneity of effects (across neighborhoods) is also 
important.   
                                                 
29 Again, these results are not reported in the interest of space.  They are available from the author. 
  44D. Summary of additional results.
There are three primary messages that these additional results convey.  First, across 
mixing measures and across specifications, the main results of the paper – that income 
mixing is not stable within a neighborhood – is shown to be robust to a number of 
changes in the model.  Section VI showed that this result was generally robust to changes 
in estimation strategy and the inclusion of control variables.  Here, we saw that the 
addition of interaction terms do not affect this general result.  Across neighborhood types, 
the stability of mixed income communities is not strong. 
  The second primary result of this section is that the interaction terms generally 
appear to be significant, so that the stability of mixed income neighborhoods and the 
effects of mixed income neighborhoods on subsequent neighborhood transition will 
depend on the nature and possibly on the history of the neighborhood.  It is difficult at 
this stage to be much more specific than this very broad statement because of the third 
primary result of this section: the measurement of income mixing can have substantial 
effects on the apparent processes by which income mixing and other neighborhood 
characteristics co-evolve.  Depending on the measure of income mixing used, mixing can 
either be increased or decreased by neighborhood demographic change.  Neighborhood 
demographic change, on the other hand, can either be induced or muted by preexisting 
income mixing.  While the measurement of income mixing does not affect the central 
question of the paper (the results in section VI are robust to the measure chosen), our 
understanding of the process of neighborhood change and its relationship with mixed-
income communities depends on how we measure mixing.  To this, more fundamental 
question the present effort is mute.  The appropriate measurement of income mixing 
  45should be linked in some way to the purported beneficial or harmful effects of such 
communities, to the specific goals of mixed income policies or (hopefully) to both.  Such 
a fine-tuned understanding of the inner-workings of neighborhoods does not yet exist. 
 
VIII. Conclusion and policy considerations. 
 
  The existence of stable, mixed-income communities has been a goal of urban 
planners for some time.  Local housing agencies, redevelopment authorities and HUD 
have all offered incentives to developers to induce the development of such communities.  
The logic of such policies would seem to be that mixed-income communities, while 
preferred by all, are un-profitable because of some sort of market imperfection.  Many 
central city governments promote their cities as places where different kinds of people 
mix freely on the assumption that mixed-income communities are attractive to most 
people. 
  In the face of these policy initiatives, it is important to understand how and why 
income mixing occurs.  The lack of a solid answer represents a gaping hole in the urban 
economics literature.  If it is the case that people really prefer to live near others of 
dissimilar means, but that profit-maximizing developers do not provide mixed-income 
housing developments, then the policies encouraging such development will be welfare 
enhancing.   
Whatever people’s preferences for income mixing per se, the results in this paper 
suggest that such neighborhoods are not stable.  The empirical evidence presented here 
suggests that the economic forces at work in residence decisions, business location and/or 
public service provision do not allow extremely mixed neighborhoods to persist.  While 
  46there may be an equilibrium level of income mixing, it is likely lower than the mixing we 
observe in our decennial census.   
  This is not to say that public policy has no place in encouraging mixed-income 
neighborhoods.  There are many justifications that might cause us to put positive social 
value on such communities.  However, as Cheshire (2007) points out, these justifications 
should not be taken for granted.  The fact that income mixing within block groups is so 
substantial (over 60 per cent of the total variance in income occurs within block-group 
boundaries) might give planners hope that sustaining mixed-neighborhoods is not 
impossible.  This paper suggests that there are strong forces working against a successful 
income-mixing policy regime.  If policy intervention is able to increase income mixing in 
a neighborhood in one time period, it is likely that between half and 90 per cent of that 
additional mixing will have been sorted out of existence over the following decade, 
depending on the parameter estimates one finds most persuasive.  This means that 
sustaining mixed income neighborhoods cannot be a one-shot investment.  Such 
neighborhoods will require continued support to maintain their economic diversity.   
However, it is probably the case that mixed income neighborhoods are no different than 
any other economic equilibrium: with enough subsidies, anything can happen.  The 
parameter estimates reported above suggest that successful income mixing strategies will 
entail continual support, not one-time capital investment. 
  The problem with such a formulation is that it is hard to define what level of 
mixing constitutes a successful “mixed” outcome.  Since the level of mixing will be 
sensitive to the level of spatial aggregation (Krupka 2007), mixed-income policies are 
working against more than equilibrium.  In the absence of workable measures of income 
  47mixing, or a clear sense of a reasonable goal, mixed income development policies will 
have a hard time striking the right balance between market distortion and the greater 
good.   
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  50Appendix A: Table of Means. 
 
 Year 
Variable 2000  1990  1980 
lnσ 10.464  10.364  10.273 
 0.405  0.694  0.334 
CoVa 0.893  1.122  1.700 
 0.422  0.478  0.525 
σ-resi -0.003  -0.022  -0.030 
 1.035  1.032  1.035 
CoVa-resi 0.003  -0.020  -0.016 
 1.011  0.777  0.703 
Income   1.013 1.011 
   0.454 0.352 
College 0.246  0.194  0.154 
 0.189  0.156  0.116 
Drop-Out 0.477  0.244  0.303 
 0.139  0.160  0.155 
Children 0.341  0.350  0.414 
 0.133  0.138  0.132 
White 0.720  0.787  0.826 
 0.289  0.281  0.253 
Wortkers 0.872  0.869  0.874 
 0.095  0.104  0.088 
Poverty 0.213     
 0.177     
Owners 0.654  0.605  0.656 
 0.264  0.254  0.225 
Stayers 0.515  0.496   
 0.149  0.159   
Value 11.692  11.349  10.800 
 0.644  0.697  0.521 
YearBuilt 1964.151  1961.504  1957.426
 16.511  14.185  11.949 
Density 7.857  7.746  7.617 
 1.734  1.824  1.914 
Distance 2.623     
 0.710     
Vacancy   0.074 0.064 
   0.081 0.056 
Commute   11.857  22.817 
   4.173 6.519 
Age     31.285 
     6.230 
Note: Sample average and standard deviation. 
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   Model 
Panel                   I II III IV V VI VII VIII
lnσ  0.2741                0.1289 0.1313 0.0804 -0.7736 -0.8066 -0.8080 -0.7016
st.  Error  0.0153                0.0086 0.0084 0.0061 0.0354 0.0372 0.0370 0.0581
Income    0.4393            0.4222 0.0378   0.2825 0.2957 0.2120
st.  Error                0.0051 0.0049 0.0035 0.0155 0.0151 0.0216
rel∆Income               0.0396  0.0048 0.0330 0.0160
st. Error      0.0021  0.0015      0.0025  0.0014 
Control variables  None  None  None  2000  None  None  None  1990-2000 
Estimation Strategy  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif. 
adj-rsq.                  0.2576 0.4542 0.4575 0.5929 0.5742 0.5959 0.5979 0.4397
A 
N  151337                151337 151337 146139 151099 151099 151099 144338
                
CoVa  0.3875                0.2950 0.2863 0.1482 -0.4149 -0.4188 -0.4146 -0.4137
st.  Error  0.0081                0.0085 0.0086 0.0065 0.0284 0.0320 0.0320 0.0368
Income    -0.2001            -0.2269 -0.0563   -0.0205 -0.0071 -0.0946
st.  Error                0.0043 0.0046 0.0045 0.0182 0.0192 0.0240
rel∆Income               0.0555  0.0109 0.0290 0.0074
st. Error      0.0028  0.0019      0.0033  0.0038 
Control variables  None  None  None  2000  None  None  None  1990-2000 
Estimation Strategy  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif. 
adj-rsq.                  0.2198 0.2554 0.2617 0.4006 0.2065 0.2066 0.2085 0.2682
B 
N  151708                151708 151708 146318 151600 151600 151600 144603
Note: standard errors are robust.  Sample includes all Block Groups in Metropolitan areas with valid data.  All regressions include Metropolitan area fixed 
effects. Dependant variable is specified measure of income mixing in 2000. 
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   Model 
Panel                 I II III IV V VI VII VIII
σ -resi  0.4187                0.4181 0.4220 0.2762 -0.4363 -0.4352 -0.4315 -0.4392
st.  Error  0.0033                0.0033 0.0033 0.0034 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0033
Income                 0.1134 0.1466 -0.0454 0.0229 -0.0096 -0.1717
st. Error    0.0067  0.0068  0.0133         0.0138 0.0141 0.0138
rel∆Income                 -0.0823 -0.1713 -0.0939 -0.1201
st.  Error                 0.0078 0.0067 0.0063 0.0054
Control  variables  None                None None 2000 None None None 1990-2000
Estimation Strategy  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif. 
adj-rsq.  0.2014                0.2039 0.2062 0.2910 0.1824 0.1824 0.1861 0.2107
C 
N  151708                151708 151708 146318 151619 151619 151619 144610
            
Cova-resi  0.4666                0.4668 0.4426 0.2308 -0.4695 -0.4693 -0.4583 -0.4414
st.  Error  0.0122                0.0123 0.0123 0.0095 0.0332 0.0333 0.0329 0.0371
Income                 -0.0161 -0.1282 -0.0070 0.0084 0.0554 -0.0245
st. Error    0.0070  0.0076  0.0086         0.0095 0.0110 0.0144
rel∆Income            0.2794  0.1473 0.1188  0.0892
st.  Error                 0.0064 0.0045 0.0064 0.0065
Control  variables  None                None None 2000 None None None 1990-2000
Estimation Strategy  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif.  First Dif. 
adj-rsq.  0.1539                0.1539 0.1816 0.3063 0.1471 0.1471 0.1538 0.1738
D 
N  151708                151708 151708 146318 151600 151600 151600 144603
Note: standard errors are robust.  Sample includes all Block Groups in Metropolitan areas with valid data.  All regressions include Metropolitan area fixed 
effects. Dependant variable is specified measure of income mixing in 2000. 
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Panel                                 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
lnσ  0.7624 0.5732 0.5759 0.2871 0.9383 1.0218 1.0175 0.1463 0.5640 0.5551 0.5552 0.5464 0.6378 0.6372 0.6269 
st.  Error  0.0528                              0.0923 0.0915 0.0794 0.0050 0.0200 0.0200 0.0215 0.0260 0.0264 0.0263 0.0273 0.0255 0.0255 0.0253
Income   0.1894  0.1675 -0.0196  -0.0624 -0.0835 0.0214  0.1163 0.1027 -0.0825 -0.0020 -0.0077 -0.0463 
st.  Error                         0.0519 0.0521 0.0225 0.0139  0.0136  0.0067 0.0129  0.0129 0.0120 0.0112 0.0108 0.0105
rel∆Inc.           0.0515 0.0096  0.0590 0.0060  0.0340 0.0116  0.0143 0.0002
st.  Error                     0.0055  0.0028 0.0091  0.0017 0.0051  0.0036 0.0024  0.0022
Controls  None                            None None 2000 None None None 2000 80 80 80 80,  2000 80,  90 80,  90 All
Strategy  IV                       IV IV IV 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
adj-rsq. -0.1081  0.1921  0.1944 0.5584 -0.2631 -0.4303 -0.4139 0.5941 0.3039 0.3179 0.3202 0.4436 0.4373 0.4380 0.4807 
A 
N  151099 151099 151099 145922 148478 148478 148478 144947 148403 148403 148403 144872 144680 144680 143381 
                   
CoVa  0.7513 0.7869 0.7775 0.4783 0.8175 0.7459 0.7287 0.3513 0.5711 0.5621 0.5574 0.4376 0.5172 0.5140 0.4359 
st.  Error  0.0213                              0.0365 0.0370 0.0528 0.0079 0.0087 0.0086 0.0198 0.0727 0.0657 0.0657 0.0624 0.0723 0.0722 0.0657
Income   0.0423  0.0298 0.1432  0.0229 0.0048 0.0684  0.0555 0.0418 0.1550 0.1827 0.1719 0.1539 
st.  Error                         0.0174 0.0185 0.0309 0.0034  0.0040  0.0123 0.0371  0.0375 0.0390 0.0480 0.0481 0.0431
rel∆Inc.           0.0195 0.0118  0.0240 0.0122  0.0268 0.0127  0.0212 0.0109
st.  Error                     0.0034  0.0022 0.0031  0.0021 0.0029  0.0023 0.0024  0.0021
Controls  None                        None None 2000 None None None 2000 80 80 80 80,  2000 80,  90 80,  90 All 
Strategy  IV                       IV IV IV 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
adj-rsq.  0.0578 0.0264 0.0360 0.3143 -0.0089 0.0612 0.0768 0.3685 0.2019 0.2085 0.2125 0.3377 0.2524 0.2549 0.3453 
B 
N  151600 151600 151600 146242 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678 148678 145021 144866 144866 143504 
Note: All standard errors are robust.  All regressions include Metropolitan area fixed effects.  Dependant variable is measure of income mixing in 2000.  IV columns 
instrument for 1990 income mixing with 1980 income mixing.  2SLS columns instrument with a battery of 1980 predictors of income mixing.  In the row for controls, “2000”  
signifies a battery of year 2000 predictors of income mixing,  “80” and “90” signify batteries of income mixing predictors for 1980 and 1990 respectively.   
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Panel                                 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
σ-resi  0.7744 0.7615 0.7721 0.6160 0.8672 0.8070 0.8296 0.4751 0.7086 0.6976 0.7030 0.6827 0.6902 0.6969 0.6951 
st.  Error  0.0073                              0.0072 0.0073 0.0111 0.0071 0.0066 0.0067 0.0190 0.0119 0.0114 0.0114 0.0119 0.0127 0.0127 0.0124
Income   0.1005  0.1527 0.2352  0.0921 0.1491 0.1163  0.2391 0.3057 0.3796 0.4078 0.4813 0.4817 
st.  Error                         0.0072 0.0071 0.0164 0.0071  0.0069  0.0211 0.0139  0.0138 0.0188 0.0247 0.0245 0.0237
rel∆Inc.            -0.1300 -0.1787 -0.1438 -0.1765  -0.1546 -0.1873  -0.1614 -0.1954
st.  Error                     0.0084  0.0071 0.0082  0.0069 0.0077  0.0073 0.0072  0.0070
Controls  None                        None None 2000 None None None 2000 80 80 80 80,  2000 80,  90 80,  90 All 
Strategy  IV                       IV IV IV 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
adj-rsq.  0.0822 0.0927 0.0914 0.2073 0.0187 0.0674 0.0574 0.2648 0.1349 0.1450 0.1495 0.1790 0.1492 0.1535 0.1789 
C 
N  151619 151619 151619 146250 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678 148678 145021 144866 144866 143504 
                   
CoVa-resi  1.0158 1.0238 0.9785 0.6176 1.1649 1.1546 1.0840 0.6391 0.8516 0.8426 0.8232 0.6596 0.7688 0.7529 0.6496 
st.  Error  0.0455                              0.0467 0.0462 0.0678 0.0114 0.0119 0.0116 0.0292 0.0977 0.0958 0.0953 0.0965 0.1067 0.1060 0.1007
Income   -0.0403  -0.1215 0.0700  -0.0404 -0.1145 0.0865  0.1156 0.0297 0.1427 0.2833 0.2006 0.1839 
st.  Error                         0.0081 0.0082 0.0143 0.0081  0.0086  0.0113 0.0159  0.0169 0.0260 0.0387 0.0386 0.0349
rel∆Inc.            0.2061 0.1524 0.1922 0.1535  0.2015 0.1517  0.1886 0.1451
st.  Error                     0.0080  0.0054 0.0074  0.0052 0.0072  0.0058 0.0056  0.0054
Controls  None                        None None 2000 None None None 2000 80 80 80 80,  2000 80,  90 80,  90 All 
Strategy  IV                       IV IV IV 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
adj-rsq. -0.0170  -0.0217  0.0210 0.2360 -0.1217 -0.1134 -0.0482 0.2296 0.0848 0.0901 0.1129 0.2230 0.1426 0.1618 0.2362 
D 
N  151600 151600 151600 146242 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678 148678 145021 144866 144866 143504 
Note: All standard errors are robust.  All regressions include Metropolitan area fixed effects.  Dependant variable is measure of income mixing in 2000.  IV columns 
instrument for 1990 income mixing with 1980 income mixing.  2SLS columns instrument with a battery of 1980 predictors of income mixing.  In the row for controls, “2000”  
signifies a battery of year 2000 predictors of income mixing,  “80” and “90” signify batteries of income mixing predictors for 1980 and 1990 respectively.   
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   Model 
Panel                     I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
lnσ  -0.0867                    -0.5330 -0.5673 -0.5435 -0.1698 -0.2051 -0.6776 0.2446 0.2461 0.2336
st.  Error  0.0235                    0.0286 0.0280 0.0342 0.0635 0.0640 0.0385 0.0306 0.0308 0.0292
Income    0.1729                  0.1955 0.1526 0.0000 0.0096 0.0520 -0.0966 -0.1035 -0.1286
st.  Error                     0.0132 0.0131 0.0129 0.0183 0.0196 0.0095 0.0179 0.0192 0.0193
rel∆Income                    0.0245 0.0096 0.0045 0.0059 -0.0075 -0.0156
st. Error      0.0028  0.0016    0.0027          0.0015 0.0032 0.0032









Strategy  2SLS                  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV IV IV 
adj-rsq.  0.1262                    0.5278 0.5463 0.4162 0.1771 0.2050 0.4606 0.5941 -0.2688 -0.2147
A 
N  148403                    148403 148403 145922 148478 148478 148478 144947 148403 148403
              
CoVa  0.2945                    0.3311 0.3118 0.3055 0.4515 0.4394 0.2951 0.1333 0.1317 0.1270
st.  Error  0.0208                    0.0243 0.0234 0.0266 0.0620 0.0603 0.0528 0.0435 0.0438 0.0431
Income    0.4579                  0.4747 0.4370 0.7869 0.8511 0.7093 0.5996 0.6649 0.6188
st.  Error                     0.0162 0.0163 0.0177 0.0444 0.0464 0.0417 0.0333 0.0355 0.0361
rel∆Income                    0.0787 0.0651 0.0907 0.0772 0.0749 0.0681
st. Error      0.0035  0.0033    0.0050          0.0044 0.0035 0.0034









Strategy  2SLS                  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV IV IV 
adj-rsq.  -0.3718                    -0.3592 -0.3170 -0.2412 -0.4879 -0.4494 -0.1928 0.3685 -0.0341 0.0111
B 
N  148678                    148678 148678 146242 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678
Note: All standard errors are robust.  Dependant variable is specified measure of income mixing.  All regressions include metropolitan fixed effects.  2SLS columns use a 
battery of 1980 predictors of 1980 income mixing as instruments.  IV columns use 1980 measure of income mixing.  Controls include changes in levels of control 
variables for 1990-2000, and for 1980-1990 (as indicated) as well as the levels (where indicated) of these predictors in 1980.   
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   Model 
Panel                     I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
σ-resi  0.2404                    0.3190 0.3329 0.3394 0.2040 0.2030 0.1570 0.1376 0.1413 0.1386
st.  Error  0.0177                    0.0211 0.0210 0.0207 0.0209 0.0204 0.0230 0.0069 0.0069 0.0065
Income    0.5148                  0.4650 0.3769 0.9475 0.8393 0.6969 0.9137 0.8100 0.6958
st.  Error                     0.0222 0.0220 0.0225 0.0342 0.0336 0.0365 0.0244 0.0253 0.0256
rel∆Income                    -0.1600 -0.1814 -0.1319 -0.1456 -0.1221 -0.1435
st. Error      0.0069  0.0069    0.0064          0.0064 0.0062 0.0063









Strategy  2SLS                  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV IV IV 
adj-rsq.  -0.2450                    -0.3329 -0.3414 -0.3251 -0.1631 -0.1552 -0.0889 0.2648 -0.0859 -0.0659
C 
N  148678                    148678 148678 146250 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678
              
CoVa-resi  -0.0301                    0.0206 -0.0683 0.0577 0.0318 0.0163 0.1800 0.0708 0.0682 0.0696
st.  Error  0.0306                    0.0368 0.0352 0.0464 0.0337 0.0333 0.0665 0.0434 0.0438 0.0440
Income    0.1338                  0.1729 0.1344 0.3508 0.4971 0.4827 0.3924 0.5744 0.4311
st.  Error                     0.0142 0.0151 0.0151 0.0209 0.0233 0.0358 0.0270 0.0305 0.0316
rel∆Income                    0.1666 0.1499 0.1891 0.1844 0.2065 0.1764
st. Error      0.0062  0.0062    0.0056          0.0087 0.0062 0.0063









Strategy  2SLS                  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV IV IV 
adj-rsq.  0.0227                    -0.0064 0.0578 0.0096 -0.0069 0.0209 -0.0712 0.2296 -0.0039 0.0177
D 
N  148678                    148678 148678 146242 148678 148678 148678 145021 148678 148678
Note: All standard errors are robust.  Dependant variable is specified measure of income mixing.  All regressions include metropolitan fixed effects.  2SLS columns use a 
battery of 1980 predictors of 1980 income mixing as instruments.  IV columns use 1980 measure of income mixing.  Controls include changes in levels of control 
variables for 1990-2000, and for 1980-1990 (as indicated) as well as the levels (where indicated) of these predictors in 1980.   
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